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The impacts of introducing or tightening time limits on welfare use are studied in an 
efficiency wage model. Those losing access to regular benefits receive some smaller benefit, 
which can be interpreted as food stamps. Stricter time limits raise both employment and 
profits and generally reduce the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Changes 
of utility levels of employed workers and recipients of regular social assistance have the same 
sign as the variation in the net wage. The utility differential between social assistance 
recipients and food stamp participants shrinks.  
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The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in redesigning welfare programs. Ob-
serving strong increases in the number of recipients during the eighties and nineties, many
states in the U.S. have started “welfare to work” reforms. One of the main features is
that time limits for welfare recipients have been introduced. According to the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilation Act (PRWORA), nobody is eligi-
ble for receiving welfare payments based on the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program for more than ﬁve years in lifetime and two years per spell.
Should time run out, there is no further access to federal cash beneﬁts, but only to some
state-ﬁnanced food stamp program in order to guarantee physical subsistence. Data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and simulation results by Gittleman (1999)
referring to the older Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program suggest
that prior to TANF around a quarter of all welfare recipients were at risk of hitting the
ﬁve year limit. Using data on AFDC taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Duncan et al. (2000) estimate that 41 per cent of the welfare caseload existing at a given
point in time would reach the ﬁve year limit within eight years.
In addition to the time limits on welfare eligibility, work requirements have often been
introduced. Unemployment may thus decrease as welfare recipients are forced in several
ways to increase their job search eﬀorts. Indeed, the number of welfare recipients in the
U.S. has fallen drastically from 5.1 million families in March 1994 to 2.1 million families
in March 2001 (Hotz et al., 2002). Surveys of the details of the U.S. welfare reform
and problems of implementing them in practice have been provided by Ellwood (2000),
Haveman and Wolfe (2000), Moﬃtt (2002), and Blank (2002).
This paper focuses on the impact of introducing time limits on welfare use on em-
ployment, wages, proﬁts, and utility levels of both employed and unemployed workers. In
contrast to the bulk of the literature, which mainly addresses incentives for labor supply,
a framework with involuntary unemployment is chosen. The contribution can be seen as
1complementing earlier analyses in which the success of welfare reform depends on changes
of the behavior of recipients. If jobs are easily available, the reason for potential employ-
ment increases is straightforward. Welfare recipients will reduce their reservation wages
when faced with a cut in their income. Under involuntary unemployment, labor demand
will respond to changes in the incentive structure of the employed who see unemployment
as a more severe threat now. New job opportunities are created aﬀecting the well-being
of forward-looking welfare recipients. This may compensate them for the time limits
imposed.
Some evidence that the decline in caseloads is actually driven by labor demand can
also be found in the empirical literature. For example, Ziliak et al. (2000) estimate
that about two thirds of the caseload decline in the AFDC program between 1993 and
1996 is explained by macroeconomic factors represented, e.g., by lower unemployment
rates. Only one third can be attributed to several regional welfare reforms adopted in
various states. Similarly, Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) ﬁnd for the UK that the
eﬀect of unemployment income on the individual hazard rate to exit unemployment is
substantially lower in periods of high unemployment, while demand-side factors captured
by the local unemployment rate have a strong negative eﬀect on the exit probability.
Hence, an analysis on the eﬀects of welfare reform is needed for a framework in which
labor demand plays a decisive role while search eﬀorts are of secondary importance or
even irrelevant. In the light of our approach, the fall in unemployment in the U.S. should
not be viewed as indicating some exogenous business cycle phenomenon. It may at least
partially be traced back to stricter welfare eligibility rules that enable ﬁrms to cut wages.
We analyze an eﬃciency wage model where workers may shirk. Since unemploy-
ment insurance is neglected, all unemployed become recipients of social assistance or
food stamps. Both branches of welfare are ﬁnanced by a proportional income tax. All
individuals are identical with respect to ability and preferences.
It is shown that imposing a stricter time limit on receiving social assistance increases
2employment. By making unemployment less comfortable, employers can cut gross wages
and raise employment without having to fear that workers lose their incentive to exert
eﬀort. In addition, a lower tax rate due to having to pay smaller beneﬁts per welfare
recipient represents a second channel that enables ﬁrms to pay lower gross wages and to
hire additional workers. With a smaller number of unemployed, the tax load tends to fall.
Since the average duration of unemployment falls with an increasing employment level,
the share of those receiving the full beneﬁt may go in either direction. The increasing
fraction of social assistance recipients among the unemployed due to a higher employment
level works against a tax cut. Net proﬁts will generally rise due to falling gross wages
and a lower tax rate. The impact on net wages is ambiguous. Expected lifetime utility
levels of employed and social assistance recipients will move in the same direction as
net wages. The utility diﬀerential between the two groups remains constant because it
is determined by the structure of incentives for employed workers. Recipients of social
assistance are compensated for the risk of losing parts of the welfare beneﬁt by improved
job opportunities. Those who would be on food stamps anyway may win in utility even
if the net wage declines since their prospects of getting a job are improved. The result
indicates that imposing stricter time limits can even lead to a Pareto improvement.
The distributional results tend to carry through if ﬁrms discriminate against food
stamp recipients when making hiring decisions. Since a higher share of food stamp recipi-
ents at a given employment level then raises reemployment probabilities of an unemployed
of a given group, it is no longer obvious that unemployment becomes more threatening,
however.
Note that, since the focus of the model is on time limits per unemployment spell, the
structure of beneﬁts resembles a two-tier system of unemployment pay. Therefore, our
contribution is related to the theory of unemployment insurance. A basic proposition
of this literature states that payments should stay constant over time if the unemployed
cannot inﬂuence their chances of gaining a job. In contrast, if the reemployment opportu-
3nities are determined by unobservable search eﬀorts, expected utility of the beneﬁciaries
is maximized by a declining beneﬁt schedule that converges to zero (Shavell and Weiss,
1979). Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) argue that welfare can be further increased in
such a moral hazard scenario if the personal wage tax increases with the duration of un-
employment. However, Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) show that declining unemployment
beneﬁts may even lead to a higher unemployment rate, since insiders will drive up their
wage demands when expecting a shorter period of unemployment upon losing their job.
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) demonstrate within an equilibrium search model that
the optimum time limit for receiving the higher beneﬁt in a two tier unemployment insur-
ance system is always positive and ﬁnite. The optimum time limit exceeds zero because
the search eﬀort of those receiving the smaller beneﬁt increases in the duration of the full
beneﬁt. Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2002) argue that unemployment beneﬁts should
even increase over time if the insurer cannot observe consumption and savings. Individuals
then prefer to ﬁnance short spells of unemployment by precautionary savings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing the model in
section 2, section 3 analyzes problems of existence and stability of equilibria. Comparative
static results are derived in section 4. Section 5 deals with the possibility that employers
discriminate against food stamp recipients. The concluding section 6 discusses the ﬁndings
and indicates directions for future research.
2T h e b a s i c m o d e l
The model is based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). We consider N identical workers whose
preferences are described by the utility function U(ω,e)=ω − e, where ω denotes the
monetary compensation and e is the eﬀort exerted at the workplace. With probability b
per unit of time, an employment relationship breaks down for exogenous reasons. Workers
are inﬁnitely lived and maximize W = E
  ∞
0 U(ω(s),e(s)) exp(−rs)ds, where s denotes
time, r>0 is the discount rate, and E represents the expectations operator. Any
4employed worker can either shirk (e =0 )or choose the required eﬀort (e =1 ) .W o r k e r s
who are shirking are detected with probability q per unit of time. Detected shirkers are
ﬁred immediately. All individuals are identical with respect to ability and preferences.
We ignore all issues arising from savings and means tests to qualify for a welfare program.
The unemployed receive a welfare beneﬁt w before the time limit is exhausted, while
the others get w, where w>w≥ 0. The lower beneﬁt may represent a food stamp
program, while the higher beneﬁt is meant to provide a minimum income above the
physical subsistence level. Welfare is ﬁnanced by a proportional tax on wages and proﬁts,
the tax rate being t.
Let V S
E ,V N
E ,a n dVu denote expected lifetime utility of employed shirkers, employed
non-shirkers, and unemployed individuals receiving the full amount of welfare beneﬁts,
respectively. The asset equations for shirkers and non-shirkers are given by
rV
S






E =( 1− t)w − e + b(Vu − V
N
E ) (2)
with w denoting the gross wage.
The asset equations have the structure that the return in a given period is equal to
the ﬂow beneﬁts plus the expected change of the value of the asset. An employed worker
will not shirk if V S
E ≤ V N
E , which is equivalent to
(1 −t)w ≥ rVu +
(r + b + q)e
q
, (3)
the no-shirking condition. If workers were risk averse, a lower wage as the one given in
(3) would be suﬃcient to induce eﬀort. Such a modiﬁcation would, however, not lead to
substantially diﬀerent outcomes.
Firms are operating under decreasing returns. Output of the representative ﬁrm is
given by Q = F(L) where L denotes eﬀective labor, i.e. the number of employed workers
5not shirking. The production function satisﬁes F  (L) > 0,F  (L) < 0 and F  (N) >e .
The last assumption implies that full employment would be eﬃcient.
An unemployed worker receiving beneﬁt w will get a job with probability au per unit
of time. Rather than introducing a ﬁxed time limit, the loss of the full beneﬁt is modeled
in a stochastic fashion. In a given period, the access to regular beneﬁts is lost with
probability h. The hazard rate h corresponds to an expected time limit and is seen as a
policy variable. If h =0 , there is no time limit on welfare use. The asset equation of an
unemployed worker receiving regular beneﬁts is
rVu = w + au(VE − Vu)+h(Vz − Vu) (4)






, and Vz denotes expected lifetime utility of a welfare recipient
in the food stamp program. An individual receiving the reduced beneﬁt faces a probability
of reentering employment of az = kau per period, where 0 <k≤ 1. The upper boundary
k =1corresponds to a situation in which employers do not discriminate against food
stamp recipients. In contrast, k<1 is the more realistic scenario in which ﬁrms are
reluctant to hire long-term unemployed. In the basic model, we assume that k =1and
set a = au = az. The case of discrimination is discussed in section 5. The asset equation
of a food stamp recipient reads
rVz = w + a(VE − Vz). (5)
If not shirking is optimal, (2), (4), and (5) can be solved. Combining (4) and (5) yields
(r + h + a)(Vu − Vz)=w − w, (6)
and subtracting (4) from (2) leads to
(r + b + a)(VE −Vu)=( 1− t)w − e − w + h(Vu −Vz). (7)
Solving the last two equations for the lifetime utility diﬀerentials, it turns out that
VE − Vu =
(1 − t)w −e −
(r + a)w + hw
r + h + a









r + a + b
[(1 −t)w − e]+
r + b
r + b + a
(r + a)w + hw




r + a+ b
[(1 − t)w − e]+
b
r + b + a
(r + a)w + hw






Inserting (10) into the no-shirking condition yields
(1 − t)w ≥
r + a+ b + q
q
e +
(r + a)w + hw
r + h + a
. (13)
Inducing workers not to shirk requires a higher wage w if either of the welfare beneﬁts, w or
w, rises, the rate of exogenous splits b increases, the rate of obtaining a new job a goes up,
the tax rate t increases, the rate of time preference r rises, or the quality of monitoring
eﬀort, measured by q, falls. Equations (8) and (13) imply that employed workers will
display a higher expected remaining lifetime utility than those being unemployed at any
given point in time. Thus, unemployment is involuntary. Compared to those receiving
full beneﬁts w, employed workers earn the information rent
e
q
. The rent arises due to the
fact that the monitoring technology is imperfect, that is, q is ﬁnite.
In equilibrium, the number of entries into unemployment must be equal to the number
of exits:
a(N − L)=bL. (14)
Similarly, the number of entries into the food stamp program has to be equal to the
number of exits:
a(N − L − U)=hU. (15)
While U individuals receive regular beneﬁts, N − L − U individuals participate in the
food stamp program. Last, the number of entrants into regular social assistance is equal
to the number of leavers:
bL =( a+ h)U. (16)
7As a = b
L
N − L
, substituting for a from (14) into (13) leads to
(1 −t)w ≥
(r + q)(N − L)+bN
q(N − L)
e +
(r(N −L)+bL)w + h(N −L)w
(r + h)(N − L)+bL
. (17)
Welfare beneﬁts are ﬁnanced through a proportional income tax t on proﬁts and
labour income. The tax base is, therefore, equal to total output F(L), implying that the
government budget equation reads
tF(L)=wU + w(N − L − U). (18)
If workers do not shirk, the representative ﬁrm will set its labor input to the point
where the marginal product of labor is equal to the gross wage, that is, where w = F (L).
Utilizing this relationship and building on (14) and (16), U =
bL(N − L)
bL + h(N − L)
shows that
feasible allocations require




bLw + h(N − L)w





All relevant decisions are taken simultaneously. The government always adjusts the in-
come tax rate instantaneously so as to balance its budget. Firms generally take as given
both the wage and the tax rate and choose employment in order to maximize their proﬁts.
They are willing to accept underbidding by unemployed workers as long as net wages are
higher than necessary to satisfy the no-shirking constraint. Conversely, should the net
wage be too low to prevent shirking, ﬁrms will increase the gross wage. Taking as given
wages, policy variables and the unemployment rate, employed workers choose whether or
not to shirk.
3 Equilibria and stability
An equilibrium is described by a level of employment that satisﬁes both the no-shirking
condition (17), now with equality, and the feasibility condition (19). The right-hand side
8of the no-shirking condition (17) is equal to





> 0 at L =0 .I t
increases in L and tends to inﬁnity if L → N. Note that the right-hand side of the
feasibility condition (19) will be equal to F  (N) > 0 if L = N. Moreover, provided that
F(0) = 0, an employment level L0 ∈ (0,N) exists which satisﬁes
 
1 −
bLw + h(N − L)w





Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium conditions. The no-shirking condition holds on
and above the NSC curve, while the feasibility curve G represents the budget constraint
of the government combined with the marginal productivity rule of pay. If the two curves










9In Figure 1, the equilibrium L1 is unstable. Should a point on the G curve between L1
and L2 be realized, the ﬁrm is willing to accept underbidding by unemployed workers. As
a consequence, employment will increase and the gross wage rate will fall. Underbidding
will no longer be accepted at L2 since the no-shirking condition would then be violated.
Rewriting (17) (with equality) and (19) shows that an equilibrium has to satisfy








(r(N − L)+bL)w + h(N −L)w
(r + h)(N − L)+bL
,




bLw + h(N − L)w











is a necessary condition for stability. In a
stable equilibrium, the NSC curve cuts the G curve from below.
4 Changing the beneﬁt loss rate
Proposition 1 summarizes the eﬀects of an increasing risk of losing the full welfare beneﬁt
and having to rely on a food stamp program.
Proposition 1 Employment L increases and the gross wage w decreases with a higher
beneﬁt loss rate (that is, a tighter time limit) h. The lifetime utility diﬀerential between
employed workers and recipients of social assistance, VE − Vu, remains constant. The
lifetime utility diﬀerential between social assistance recipients and participants in the food
stamp program, Vu − Vz, shrinks. Lifetime utility levels of employed workers and social
assistance recipients move in the same direction as the net wage.
Proof. See Appendix A. ￿
The comparative statics can be interpreted as follows. A higher beneﬁt loss rate
is equivalent to a stricter time limit of receiving welfare beneﬁts. As a consequence, the
10threat of unemployment becomes more severe. The minimum wage needed to induce eﬀort
at the workplace decreases, which corresponds to shifting the NSC curve downwards. Due
to a higher share of food stamp recipients at a given level of unemployment, the tax burden
decreases. The feasibility curve G shifts upwards for any positive unemployment level.
Any gross wage now corresponds to a higher net wage. The tax reduction thus represents
a second channel allowing to cut wages and increase employment.
The unemployed are hurt by the loss in expected beneﬁts. At the same time, their
job opportunities become better. Moreover, their net wage changes once they reenter
employment. For employed workers, the threat of unemployment is more serious now
due to stricter time limit for receiving the full beneﬁt. At the same time, the increasing
opportunities of regaining employment work in the opposite direction. In any case, they
are also confronted with a variation in their net wage. It turns out that the lifetime
utility diﬀerental between employed workers and those receiving social assistance remains
unchanged, while the net impact on per period utility for each of these groups is deter-
mined by the variation in net wages. Employed workers and social assistance recipients
are aﬀected symmetrically because the no-shirking condition dictates that the utility dif-
ferential is exclusively determined by the eﬀort level at the workplace and the quality of
the detection technology. The impact of the stricter time limit on food stamp recipients is
more positive. In the model, it takes two transitions, into and out of employment, before
the time limit can bite. Food stamp recipients thus beneﬁt from better opportunities to
leave unemployment and, as forward-looking agents, are also aﬀected by the change in
net wages. Their relative utility position compared to the other two groups of workers
improves in terms of absolute utility diﬀerentials.
Tedius computations provided in Appendix B show the reaction of the equilibrium
tax rate to a rising beneﬁt loss rate. The outcome is not obvious because the fall in
unemployment will be associated with a smaller share of food stamp recipients among
the unemployed. While being quite implausible, an increase in total welfare beneﬁts via
11a rising number of high beneﬁt recipients cannot be excluded. It is demonstrated that
the equilibrium tax rate will fall if either the discount rate or the beneﬁt loss rate is
suﬃciently small. Therefore, we ignore the possibility of a perverse tax reaction in the
following.
Firms take advantage of the lower gross wage and the lower tax rate. Their net proﬁts
must increase according to
∂πn
∂h



































(w − w)(r(N − L)+bL)(N −L)







bLw + h(N − L)w







bLw + h(N −L)w
bL + h(N − L)








   
,
is ambiguous in general and mainly depends on properties of the production function and
the cost of a welfare recipient. If the marginal product of labor responds to a higher labor
input in an unelastic fashion (F   (L) close to zero), the tax reduction is the dominant
eﬀect, implying a rise in net wages. Conversely, if the change in the marginal product of
labor is stronger, while w is small, the overall eﬀect will go in the opposite direction.
Interestingly, the share of food stamp recipients among the unemployed does not nec-
essarily increase. According to equation (15), the ratio between individuals with regular
beneﬁts and food stamp recipients is equal to
U




. While a stricter time
12limit (higher h) directly induces a higher share of food stamp recipients, the resulting
higher employment level is associated with a rising job acquisition rate a. The latter
eﬀect reduces the number and the share of those losing the full welfare beneﬁt. Hence,






a smaller share of food stamp recipients among the unemployed will turn out. This is
illustrated by an example presented in Appendix C.
Should net wages fall, it may still be the case that introducing time limits wins a
political majority. First, the residual income, which can be interpreted as capital income,
increases. Provided there is a suﬃciently even distribution of wealth, losses in workers’
expected utility may be oﬀset by gains in capital income. Second, workers may take into
account that there is a higher chance to be among the employed in this framework. A
worker taking decisions behind a veil of ignorance — that is, not knowing the realization of
his employment status — may opt for the stricter time limit even if this is associated with a
utility reduction under all possible employment states. In fact, the higher total production
outweighs the additional eﬀort of the workers. With risk-neutral agents deciding under a
veil of ignorance, this property calls for abolishing regular social assistance. However, it
should be noted that the probability of having to face the least fortunate state of a food
stamp recipient will often increase. If workers are risk averse, a utilitarian government
will therefore typically not simply set the time limit to zero.
With the veil of ignorance removed, the outcome can be reversed. A Pareto improve-
ment may even not be achieved by taxing capital on a lump-sum basis and redistributing
the proceeds equally among the workers. Note that this type of redistribution does not
aﬀect incentives in the model. Yet, as the share of workers enjoying the highest utility
level increases, capital owners and both employed and unemployed workers may lose after
redistribution has taken place in such a setting.
135 Discrimination
Employers are often reluctant to hire individuals who are long-term unemployed or food
stamp recipients. Such a behavior can be justiﬁed if unemployment causes a depreciation
of human capital or if a long duration of unemployment is informative as a signal for
a possible low quality of the worker. Of course, preferring short-term unemployed job
seekers can also be a sign of discrimination which is costless to the ﬁrm if labor supply is
homogenous. This latter aspect is incorporated into the model as follows.
In each period of time, an individual receiving the reduced amount of beneﬁts faces a
probability of reentering employment of az = kau, where 0 <k<1. The asset equation
of a food stamp recipient now reads
rVz = w + az(VE − Vz). (22)
If not shirking is optimal, (2), (4), and (22) can be solved. Combining (4) and (22)
yields
(r + h + kau)(Vu − Vz)=w − w +( 1− k)au(VE −Vu), (23)
and subtracting (4) from (2) leads to
(r + b+ au)(VE − Vu)=( 1−t)w − e − w + h(Vu − Vz). (24)
Solving the last two equations for the lifetime utility diﬀerentials, it turns out that
VE − Vu =
(1 − t)w −e −
(r + kau)w + hw
r + kau + h
r + b + au
r + kau + kh
r + kau + h
, (25)
Vu − Vz =
w −w
r + kau + h
+
(1 − k)au
r + kau + h
·
(1 − t)w − e −
(r + kau)w + hw
r + kau + h
r + b + au
r + kau + kh





au +( r + b)ψ
[(1 − t)w − e]+
(r + b)ψ
au +( r + b)ψ
(r + kau)w + hw




au +( r + b)ψ
[(1 − t)w − e]+
bψ
au +( r + b)ψ
(r + kau)w + hw
r + kau + h
, (28)
where ψ =
r + kau + h






Inserting (27) into the no-shirking condition (3) yields, after rearranging,
(1 − t)w ≥ e +
(r + kau)w + hw
r + kau + h
+





If (30) holds with equality, it follows from (25) that VE −Vu =
e
q
. As in the basic model,
decreasing the time limit does not aﬀect the utility diﬀerential between employed workers
and recipients of social assistance. Applying the same equality to the other lifetime utility
diﬀerential, we ﬁnd that
Vu − Vz =
w − w +( 1− k)au
e
q
r + h + kau
. (31)
As in the baseline case, the equilibrium number of entries into unemployment must
be equal to the number of exits:
au[U + k(N −L − U)] = bL. (32)
Further, the number of entries into the food stamp program is equal to the number of
exits:
kau(N − L − U)=hU. (33)
Finally, the number of new unemployed is equal to the number of those no longer receiving
regular beneﬁts.
bL =( au + h)U. (34)







. Hence, the share of food stamp recipients increases
15with a stronger discrimination against long-term unemployed (lower k), a tighter labor
market situation (smaller au) and a stricter time limit (higher h). The equilibrium share
of beneﬁciaries of the food stamp program among all welfare recipients is










Rewriting equation (32) as au [(N −L) −(1 − k)(N − L − U)] = bL, and replacing
(N − L − U) from (35) yields
 




(N − L)=bL. (36)
In the case of discrimination, with k<1, this leads to a quadratic equation with respect
to au for a given employment level L. However, there is always one negative and one
positive root, only the latter being relevant:
au =









































As in the basic model, the employment probability au increases with a higher number of
jobs. In the case of discrimination the chances for a social assistance recipient to reenter
employment increase with a stricter time limit keeping employment ﬁxed. For a given
number of unemployed, a stricter time limit implies that the share of food stamp recipients
increases. Since these long-term unemployed are discriminated according to a constant
16factor and the number of exits out of unemployment stays constant, the probability of
leaving unemployment must increase for any member of a given group.
Combining the government budget equation,
tF(L)=wU + w(N − L − U), (38)
with the labor demand equation w = F  (L) yields the feasibility condition


















With the hazard rate au given from (37), equation (39) and the aggregate no-shirking
condition (30) determine employment L and the net wage (1 − t)w.
Appendix D shows the impact of increasing the beneﬁt loss rate on employment. There
are counteracting forces on the no-shirking curve. On the one hand, unemployment is
associated with an increased risk of losing the full beneﬁt. On the other hand, the chances
to regain employment increase in both states of unemployment. Thus, it is no longer
obvious that unemployment becomes more threatening. Similarly, the tax rate tends to
fall due to a smaller share of recipients of the high beneﬁt at given job acquisition rates.
However, the rising job acquisition rates change the structure of unemployment in favor
of the regular social assistance recipients. The last eﬀect in isolation tends to increase the
tax rate. While we cannot show that employment grows in any case, the result holds if
the strength of discrimination is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 2 shows that the distributional implications are quite similar to the sce-
nario of the basic model.
Proposition 2 Under discrimination of food stamp recipients in the labor market, the
lifetime utility diﬀerential between employed workers and social assistance recipients, VE−
Vu, remains constant under a stricter time limit. The lifetime utility diﬀerential between
social assistance recipients and participants in the food stamp program, Vu−Vz, is shrinking




w −w +( r + h)
e
q
. Lifetime utility of
employed workers and social assistance recipients move in the same direction as the net
wage.
Proof. Recalling that VE − Vu =
e
q
, it immediately follows that a variation in the
beneﬁt loss rate leaves the utility diﬀerential between employed workers and recipients of











(r + h)(1 − k)
e
q
− k(w − w)











w − w +( 1− k)au
e
q










> 0 hold, the ﬁrst term is non-positive if and only if
k ≥   k. This suﬃces to prove the second claim. ￿
As in the basic model, the utility diﬀerential between employed workers and regular
social assistance recipients is exclusively determined by the eﬀort level at the workplace
and the shirking detection technology. It turns out that discrimination in hiring deci-
sions does not aﬀect the main result: the net change in lifetime utility of employed and
short-term unemployed is perfectly correlated with the change in the net wage. While
discrimination clearly increases the utility diﬀerential between social assistance recipients
and participants in the food stamp program, the diﬀerential tends to shrink with a tighter
time limit.
6 Conclusions
The main message of the paper is that changes in the net wage are of particular importance
when evaluating the welfare consequences of introducing or tightening time limits in social
18assistance systems. Lifetime utilities of employed and short-term unemployed workers
move in the same direction as the net wage, while the poorest long-term unemployed
may gain in expected lifetime utility even if employers are reluctant to hire food stamp
recipients.
Though unemployment generally falls, the structure of unemployment may in extreme
cases display a surprising evolution. The stricter time limit in itself induces a smaller share
of recipients of full beneﬁt recipients. At the same time, the rising number of jobs reduces
the average duration of unemployment, where the resulting higher share of short-term
unemployed can oﬀset the direct eﬀect of the stricter time limit.
Evaluating the aggregate welfare consequences of introducing or tightening time limits
on beneﬁt receipts remains diﬃcult due to its distributional implications. While the
expected increase in total output bears the potential for a Pareto improvement, a higher
share of food stamp recipients is certain when the time limit is introduced, and it will
often turn out when the time limit is tightened. On the other hand, the analysis indicates
that food stamp recipients are winners of the welfare reform in terms of utility diﬀerentials
when compared to other workers.
Introducing heterogeneous types of labor represents an extension of the model that
may prove useful to shed more light on the distributional implications of varying eligibility
rules for welfare recipients. In particular, skilled workers will typically subsidize unskilled
workers in the welfare system. Due to their higher productivitiy, the shirking model
implies that the unemployment rate of skilled workers falls short of the unemployment
rate of unskilled workers. Further, at a given proportional tax rate, the higher wage
per worker is mirrored in a higher tax payment. A fall in unemployment reduces the
subsidy per employed skilled worker towards the unskilled unemployed. Another eﬀect
arises should skilled and unskilled labor be complements in production. In this event,
any fall in unemployment of one type of labor raises the productivity of the other type of
labor, implying a positive impact on welfare of the other group.
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A: Proof of Proposition 1
Utilizing the implicit function theorem, it follows for any variable
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B: Impact on the tax rate
Calculating the impact of raising the beneﬁt loss rate on the tax rate in the basic model
from equation (19), where (14) is taken into account, yields
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20The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side in the ﬁrst line shows the smaller expenditure level
due to the higher share of food stamp recipients at a given unemployment rate. The
second term mirrors the change in the structure of unemployment towards a higher share
of social assistance recipients with a fall in total unemployment. Finally, the second line
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< 0 if either the discount rate r or the beneﬁt loss rate h is suﬃciently
close to zero.
C: Example with falling share of food stamp recipients
Assume a production function with diminishing marginal returns pLα +3 L with the
parameter values p = 10000 and α = .001, a population of N = 1000, an interest rate of
r = .04, required eﬀort of e =0 .1, a separation rate of b = .01, a detection probability
of q =0 .9, social assistance of w =1and food stamp payment of w =0 .1. For the
corresponding beneﬁt loss rate h given in Table 1 we compute the stable employment
level and the ratio of regular beneﬁt recipients to food stamp recipients.
22hL a / h
12 5 0 .61 3.3442 × 10−3
0.82 1 1 .23 3.3475 × 10−3
0.61 6 6 .57 3.3310 × 10−3
0.41 1 7 .50 3.3286 × 10−3
0.26 5 .267 3.4912× 10−3
Table 1. Impact on structure of welfare recipients.
It turns out that the share of regular social assistance recipients falls when increasing
the beneﬁt loss rate from .2 to .4. The opposite reaction occurs when increasing this rate
from .4 to .8.
D: Impact on employment under discrimination
Notice that the equilibrium ((1 − t)w,L) is determined by the two equations
fd1 =( 1 − t)w − e −
(r + kau)w + hw
r + kau + h
−
r + b + au
r + kau + kh
r + kau + h
q
e,










with fd1 = fd2 =0where au(L,h). Stability requires fd2L − fd1L > 0. According to the







Evaluating the numerator yields
fd2h − fd1h =
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is valid, the ﬁrst two terms are negative. The
two other terms tend to zero for k → 1. The sign of these two terms is given by
sgn[[r + kau]au − h[h +( 1−k)au]], which is positive for h suﬃciently small.
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